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Abstract. CAPTCHAs are a widely deployed mechanism for ensuring
that a web site user is a human, and not a software agent. They ought
to be relatively easy for a human to solve, but hard for software to
interpret. Most CAPTCHAs are visual, and this marginalises users with
visual impairments. A variety of audible CAPTCHAs have been trialled
but these have not been very successful, largely because they are easily
interpreted by automated tools and, at the same time, tend to be too
challenging for the very humans they are supposed to verify. In this paper
an alternative audio CAPTCHA, jCAPTCHA (Jumbled Words CAPT-
CHA), is presented. We report on the evaluation of jCAPTCHA by 272
human users, of whom 169 used screen readers, both in terms of usability
and resistance to software interpretation.
1 Introduction
One of the blights on the web is the pervasiveness of automated software agents
that masquerade as humans to attack websites [8]. To counteract this, the
Completely Automated Public Turing tests are used to tell Computers and
Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) [16]. These are interactive tests that human users
can pass but which are diﬃcult for software attackers to solve. We will refer to
this metric as the Easy 4 Humans, Hard 4 Software (E4H-H4S) test.
Fig. 1. Example of letter shape distortion CAPTCHAS (Google & Yahoo)
Generally CAPTCHAs are visual and consist of distorted text that users are
required to decipher. Sometimes the shape and positioning of letters are changed
(Figure 1) or background noise is added [12]. Such CAPTCHAs are often diﬃcult
to read or easy to break using specially designed crackers, failing the E4H-H4S
test [4, 11].
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Oﬀering only visual CAPTCHAs ignores a sizeable portion of the online
community. Hence audio CAPTCHAs have been introduced: users transcribe
the characters that they hear, instead of those they see. Many have, thus far,
failed the E4H-H4S test [13, 10].
The World Wide Web Consortium lists CAPTCHAs as one of the greatest
security-related problems for users who “have low vision, or have a learning
disability such as dyslexia” [2] and accommodating these users is a legal require-
ment in the UK [1]. Accordingly, we have developed a novel audio CAPTCHA
that our user study shows is usable and accessible.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the current
state of play with respect to audio CAPTCHAs. Section 3 then presents the
jCAPTCHA solution, and explains how it was evaluated. Section 4 reﬂects on
the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
Suggested success rates for human users of CAPTCHAs should be around 90%
and 0.01% for automated systems [5]. Achieving this is non-trivial. Bigham et al.
[3] found that an audio CAPTCHA used to secure a high school course website
was impenetrable by any of his 15 blind students. A 2008 study into the usability
of the 8 digit audio CAPTCHA reported only a 46% pass rate. Based on a review
of the literature, three particular design aspects are pertinent: content, timing
and accessibility.
Content
Most audio CAPTCHAs require a user to hear, recognise and transcribe what
they hear. As a ﬁrst step, CAPTCHAs have to make sure that the articulated
words are relatively common and easy to spell, then that the accent is easily un-
derstandable. In reality, most audio CAPTCHAs exclusively use digits to avoid
spelling errors.
Similarly to visual CAPTCHAs, audio CAPTCHAs have to resist automated
attacks. Often the digits are distorted, or background noise added, to resist au-
tomated recognition eﬀorts. A popular resistance method is to add formatted
human speech, perhaps played backwards or at a diﬀerent volume to the charac-
ters of the actual CAPTCHA. This is supposed to make it harder for automated
attacks to segment the digits. Unfortunately attackers have quickly found a way
to strip this from the CAPTCHAs [6]. Moreover, composing audio CAPTCHA
clips of digits, a very limited vocabulary, weakens the CAPTCHA unacceptably
[15].
Using words increases the size of the vocabulary which makes CAPTCHAs
harder to decipher automatically [15]. Language-based speech recognition tools
have adapted by making use of contextual clues to ease the attacking process.
They examine articulated words in context and identify a word by using both
the audio characteristics of the word itself and the probability of such a word
occurring, given the surrounding words. Contextual clues within phrases ease
recognition for humans too [14].
Using words unfortunately re-introduces the spelling issue. One way of ad-
dressing this is to relax the exactness requirement. Non-exact matching will assist
humans but not necessarily improve the success rates of automated attacking
systems [15] so this is a technique that would be worth considering to improve
E4H.
Timing:
A visual CAPTCHA is processed as a unit, whereas an audio CAPTCHA needs
to be processed sequentially. The duration of audio CAPTCHA clips usually
ranges from 3 to 25.1 seconds. Solving may well require multiple replays of the
clip. The previously reported solve time is 65.64s [10]. Using radio clips to form
the audio CAPTCHA could reduce the solve time to only 35.75s . Using words
instead of nonsense characters also decreases the solve time since the context
assists recognition [14, 10].
Accessibility
The ﬁnal problem is related to the use of screen readers. CAPTCHAs require
the user to enter an answer in a text box. Screen reader users are disadvantaged
as they do not have access to their problem source whilst entering their answer,
ergo, the answer must be entered from memory. Screen reader users have likened
this to having visual CAPTCHAs with the problem image and answer text box
on diﬀerent webpages. Playing the audio clip also usually requires leaving the
text entry ﬁeld. The screen reader will normally narrate the page contents as the
user navigates to the playback controls, and can then can talk over the audio
CAPTCHA, inadvertently confusing the user.
3 jCAPTCHA Evaluation
In proposing a new kind of CAPTCHA we have attempted to address content
and timing by using words derived from public media (to improve usability),
and to design speciﬁcally to accommodate screen readers.
jCAPTCHA is an audio CAPTCHA that uses words as content out of context.
As such, they rely on grammatical noise to fool language model-based speech
recognition tools. The presence of grammatical noise avoids the need for further
noise to be added to the audio clip. Therefore the answer can be ‘hidden in
plain sight’ allowing humans to have a pleasant and straightforward experience
in solving the jCAPTCHA but rendering current automated speech recognition
tools unreliable.
The jCAPTCHAs were generated by manually concatenating audio clips from
publicly available media to construct unusual phrases. The text used for the
jCAPTCHAs can be viewed in Table 1.
ID jCAPTCHA text ID jCAPTCHA text
1 very impressive helping hand 2 in britain vanilla look like
3 move on completely silent 4 into the water slightly forward
5 silent industry lift days 6 lift dinner push beauty
7 prize electric car ages 8 push food list guests
9 prize days screw push 10 bone ﬁtness age glorious
Table 1. jCAPTCHA ID with the expected answer text
An evaluation webpage that allowed users to solve the ten jCAPTCHAs was
implemented. High contrast colours were used and extraneous html elements
removed to improve screen reader navigation and control. Bespoke user controls
were oﬀered to visually impaired users allowing them to transcribe jCAPTCHAs
without needing to switch back and forth between media controls and the text
entry ﬁeld. Screen reader users use the ‘full stop’ key to play the audio ﬁle while
the text ﬁeld is active, and use the standard alphanumeric keys to enter their
answer during or while the audio is playing.
The evaluation follows a design very similar to other studies assessing the
usability of CAPTCHAs [10, 7, 13]. To accommodate human error or spelling
mistakes, a Levenshtein distance [7] of two was allowed when judging the cor-
rectness of an answer. For the purpose of this experiment a distance of one was
allowed for each word, with a possibility of one word being completely incorrect,
whilst the answer as a whole still being judged as correct. Therefore in the an-
swer to a 5-word jCAPTCHA 4 of the words must have at most a Levenshtein
edit distance of one. The edit distance was chosen to allow for diﬀerences in
pluralisation of words and typos, without accepting majorly diﬀerent phrases.
By evaluating, we wanted to answer the following questions:
– What is the success rate of jCAPTCHAs (i.e. can users comprehend them?)
– Is the experience more enjoyable for users compared to other audio CAPT-
CHAs?
– How long does it take to solve?
– Do the embedded controls ease the process?
The evaluation involved the following steps:
1. Demographic Questionnaire, to collect name, email address, age range, visual
impairments, use of screen reader, IT expertise, hearing problems, other
disabilities and spoken languages.
2. An initial training was given to allow participants to familiarise themselves
with use of the site and solving jCAPTCHA.
3. Ten jCAPTCHAs were presented, one at a time. The users listened to an
audio clip and attempted to type the words that they heard. Participants
were then given the expected answer along with their own answer, as well
as an indication of whether their answer was deemed close enough to the
expected answer to have been accepted.
4. An exit questionnaire to gather satisfaction ratings and to collect additional
comments.
After obtaining ethical approval, participants were recruited using social me-
dia and advertisements within the visually impaired community (talking newspa-
pers and blind institutions). Respondents used the website with their traditional
web-browsing set up, with or without screen readers.
3.1 Evaluating E4H (Easy 4 Humans)
272 individuals (173 Male, 96 Female, 3 Undisclosed) participated (138 aged
between 18 and 30, 72 between 31 and 50 and 55 were 51 or over; 7 participants
chose to not disclose their age range). 169 participants used a screen reader
whereas 103 did not.
A number of user behaviours were monitored on the answer pages of the
experiment. Time taken to submit an answer to each jCAPTCHA 4, key presses
on input box and number of plays of jCAPTCHA audio were recorded. These
measurements can be used to determine the process the user went through when
typing their answer (multiple changes to words, misspellings, multiple plays,
etc.).
Figure 2 shows the time taken to submit an answer for each jCAPTCHA
with and without a screen reader. The mean time was 27.12 seconds. This mea-
surement includes the time taken to load the page, listen to the audio at least
once and to submit an answer. The graph also shows the success rate for users
with and without a screen reader.
89 of the 103 non-screen reader users found jCAPTCHA easy to use. One
non-screen reader user reported that they ‘were frustrating to use, would rather
use normal way of doing it’. Luckily this was the only participant to express a
purely negative opinion on the jCAPTCHA system.
139 of 169 screen reader users felt that jCAPTCHA was easy to use. Most
users went on to say that the idea was much easier than alternatives. 22 of
169 users commented negatively about the clarity of the words in the audio
clips. Common problems were the rate of the words in the audio or the pitch.
A small number wanted the word segmentation improved, or wanted the speech
rate slowed down. The general consensus from participants was mostly positive
except for these issues.
3.2 Evaluating H4C (Hard 4 Computers)
Traditionally a paper that introduces a new security mechanism would include a
summary of its resiliency against attacks. The robustness of the technique could
be demonstrated by showing an expression of the entropy of possible solutions or
by attacking the CAPTCHA. The results of a brief evaluation of freely available
4 The time used in the calculation is measured server side. It is a measure of the time
(in seconds) from the page being sent until the answer is received.
Fig. 2. Timings and Pass Rates
ASR tools is oﬀered but these do not simulate a motivated CAPTCHA breaking
attempt.
Two popular dictation programs (Dragon: Naturally Speaking5 and iSpeech6)
were used to test the resilience of jCAPTCHAs to automated software interpre-
tation. The dictation software was ﬁrst calibrated using clips of the same speaker
for 31 words or phrases. The dictation software then attempted to interpret each
jCAPTCHA. The responding transcription was manually recorded and evaluated
for correctness using the same metric as used for participants.
Two of the 10 jCAPTCHAs were correctly interpreted: jCAPTCHA 4 was
a perfect match. jCAPTCHA 5 was partially solved, with two words correctly
identiﬁed and the Levenshtein edit distance [9] permitted the word ‘gift’ instead
of the expected ‘lift’.
jCAPTCHA 4 is, in hindsight, a suboptimal phrase since the word order
could feasibly be used in normal conversation. It thus fails to meet the intended
design goals. In the case of jCAPTCHA 5, the software submitted ﬁve words
for the four word jCAPTCHA. Future heuristics for judging the correctness of
the jCAPTCHAs should limit the number of possible words submitted in given
answers, else multiple homonyms could be entered and used to break the jCAP-
TCHA.
5 http://www.nuance.co.uk/dragon/index.htm
6 www.ispeech.org
4 Discussion
jCAPTCHAs approach the desired 90% pass rate [5]. However, it should be
acknowledged that these jCAPTCHAs only use one speaker, and the results
may well diﬀer if multiple speakers, accents and languages are employed in the
audio clip formation stage.
The pass rate for all visually impaired users is 83.78% which is a remarkable
improvement on the 46% pass rate given in [13]. It should be noted that Sauer’s
experiment [13] used a much smaller sample size (6) and ages were between
28 and 54, so the results may well be a worst-case scenario. The pass rate for
reCAPTCHA is 70% [15] but for this study no demographic information was
reported.
The mean answer submission time for screen reader users (31.46 seconds) is
slightly faster than the reported time of 35.75 seconds in [10]. Only 10 screen
reader users participated in the Lazar study whereas 169 participated in this
study, making it diﬃcult to conclude deﬁnitively which is the faster. Moreover,
Lazar does not describe the method for recording answer times, it may only have
measured time spent between the page having loaded and the answer message
being sent to the server which would shorten the given time compared to the
timings collected in our study. The mean answer submission time for non-screen
reader users is 20.35 seconds, similar to the reported time of 22.8 seconds in [10].
It is likely that jCAPTCHAs do not oﬀer signiﬁcant improvements in answer
submission time compared to radio clip based CAPTCHAs [10].
Before jCAPTCHA can be advanced as a viable alternative CAPTCHA a
system needs to be created that can generate jCAPTCHAs automatically. To
do this a corpus of audio clips and a reverse language model need to be created.
The system should be tested with specially conﬁgured audio recognition toolkits
to ensure that the words and ordering are resilient to more rigorous attacks.
5 Conclusion
The concept of a CAPTCHA was introduced and the accessibility issues ex-
plored. We then proposed a new, more accessible CAPTCHA called jCAPT-
CHA. We presented the results of our evaluation, which included participants
using screen readers as well as those without visual impairments.
The results show that jCAPTCHAs are moderately resistant to recognition
by oﬀ-the-shelf audio recognition programs. The jCAPTCHAs should be tested
more rigorously with use of a toolkit that has been customised to recognise
the types of clips used in the CAPTCHA. These jCAPTCHAs utilised only
one speaker. Future jCAPTCHAs should use multiple speakers, accents and
languages in order to diversify the vocabulary and thwart automated attacks.
The CAPTCHAs were created by hand, and, as such, it is not possible to
give the entropy of all possible generated jCAPTCHAs. Given an automated
system we would need to carefully consider how likely a training based attack
can be developed. At this point we could then express the limits of the generation
algorithm. If jCAPTCHA were ever deployed in the wild, it is predictable that
attackers and defenders would enter a cat and mouse game of creating, updating
and breaking the language models employed.
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